Bronx Baseball Bat & Ball Set

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Thousands of students from MIT, Harvard, and Princeton had been put through the quiz, and you’d think that anyone in these prestigious universities would be able to solve this problem with an unerring ease. Not so fast. It turned out that more than 50% responded with the knee-jerk—incorrect—answer. The two systems that led to the choices. Newell BR, & Shanks DR (2014). Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 1–19. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12003214 [ PubMed] [ CrossRef] [ Google Scholar]

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The two systems that led to the choices.

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